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Abstract 
 
This research investigates the effectiveness of autonomous wide area 
search munitions using cooperative and non-cooperative behavior algorithms 
under various scenarios. The scenarios involve multiple autonomous munitions 
searching for an unknown number of targets with different priorities at unknown 
locations. For the cooperative cases, communications are allowed between the 
munitions to help locate, identify, and decide to pursue an attack on a target or to 
continue searching the rest of the battlefield. For non cooperative cases, munitions 
independently search, detect, identify and decide to attack an identified target or 
continue to search. Performance of the cooperative munitions depends on 
numerous parameters such as target types, number, mobility, battlefield 
characteristics, warhead lethality, decision objectives, and variability in the 
battlefield. 
The results were examined under characteristics of warhead lethality, ATR 
capability, false target attack rate, number of munitions deployed in the 
simulation, and search weight.  Cooperative munitions demonstrated significant 
decrease in the number of killed targets. Cooperative behavior reduced the 
number of false target attacks significantly.  
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ANALYSIS OF COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR FOR AUTONOMOUS WIDE AREA 
SEARCH MUNITIONS 
 
I.  Introduction 
1.1 General 
The problem being addressed in this research is the effectiveness of autonomous 
wide area search munitions using cooperative and non-cooperative behavior algorithms 
under various scenarios. The scenarios involve multiple autonomous munitions searching 
for an unknown number of targets with different priorities at unknown locations. For the 
cooperative cases, communications are allowed between the munitions to help locate, 
identify, and decide to pursue an attack on a target (and which munition will attack) or to 
continue searching the rest of the battlefield. For non cooperative cases, munitions 
independently search, detect, identify and decide whether to attack an identified target or 
continue to search. Performance of the cooperative munitions depends on numerous 
parameters such as target types, number, mobility, battlefield characteristics, warhead 
lethality, decision objectives, and variability in the battlefield.  
AFRL/VA sponsored this research.  All research was conducted at the Air Force 
Institute of Technology (AFIT), Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. 
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1.2 Background  
 
Due to the changing national military objectives and diminishing budgets the Air 
Force has begun to decline the size of its combat forces. For this reason the Air Force is 
conducting several projects in order to maintain or improve combat effectiveness with 
fewer numbers. One of the ways of keeping and enhancing its war fighting capabilities is 
to search for new technical and operational concepts. Mission efficiency has become as 
important as mission effectiveness, and this has led to interest in small, autonomous cost 
efficient weapons (1)(2). These autonomous weapons can also be helpful to reduce the 
mission planning effort and intelligence since they have the ability to search, classify and 
decide to attack the classified targets.  
 The smaller the weapons get the harder it is to achieve satisfactory lethality. 
Some loss in lethality associated with a smaller warhead can be compensated for by more 
accurate terminal guidance. A complementary approach is to use cooperative behavior to 
bring multiple munitions to bear on critical targets. The net effect can be to increase both 
the effectiveness and the efficiency of the overall aircraft/munition system.   
A RAND study examined rationale for cooperative behavior between Proliferated 
Autonomous Weapons (PRAWNS) equipped with near-term automatic target recognition 
systems (2). Their objective was “to explore the potential of innovative cooperative air-
to-ground weapon system concepts that integrate advances in ethology, robotics, and 
modern military technology”. A swarming algorithm was used to implement the desired 
cooperative behavior. Their study showed that communications, Automatic Target 
Recognition (ATR) and sensors and navigation system are required to implement the 
swarming munition concept. Their study showed that by allowing communications 
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between swarm weapons, a group of individually less capable weapons may show 
capabilities that can exceed those conventional systems with no communication. The 
decision algorithm used by RAND does not show a comparison of their decision 
algorithm with other alternatives. Further, the munitions in their study have no possibility 
of encountering false targets. According to Jacques, false target attacks need to be taken 
into consideration when evaluating the effectiveness of autonomous wide area search 
munitions (5). Some false target attacks are inevitable due to the stochastic nature of the 
ATR process. Therefore, false target attacks must be considered as a degrading parameter 
for effectiveness in autonomous wide area search munitions.  
Gillen investigated cooperative behavior through the use of a simulation program. 
Gillen developed a decision methodology for cooperative behavior and evaluated the  
effectiveness of it against a baseline of non-cooperative munitions (3)(4). His study 
showed that loss of lethality due to a smaller warhead can be overcome by applying 
cooperative engagement to the wide area search munitions. 
In his study, Dunkel showed that cooperative behavior does not always improve 
the effectiveness of the wide area search munitions  (1). The amount of improvement or 
degradation depends on the form of cooperative behavior and the specific scenario. His 
study emphasizes that the combination of cooperative classification and attack typically 
outperforms cooperative attack only because of the lower effective false target attack rate 
associated with cooperative classification. Park studied the validity of simulations for 
wide area search munitions (9). His study show that a properly designed wide area search 
munition simulation can be effectively used to predict the performance of these munitions 
under prescribed conditions. 
 
 4
1.3 Objectives 
The Primary objective of this study is to investigate and compare the effectiveness 
of wide-area search munitions using cooperative and non cooperative behavior 
algorithms under various scenarios. More specific sub objectives are: 
 
1. Modify a simulation to highlight possible advantages of cooperative 
behavior in autonomous wide area search munitions. 
2. Further explore under what scenarios it is advantageous or 
disadvantageous to use cooperative behavior.  
3.  Compare and find out any benefits gained by implementing cooperative 
behavior in wide area search munition. 
4. Analyze the sensitivities of the decision rules and parameters and 
determine which parameters should be given special attention. 
1. 4 Approach and Scope 
For this research a computer simulation is used to model multiple autonomous 
wide area search munitions that search, classify and attack targets. Within the search area 
both real and false targets are uniformly distributed. For predetermined battlefield 
characteristics both non-cooperative and cooperative cases are examined. In the non-
cooperative cases autonomous munitions are not allowed to communicate with each 
other. Hence each individual munition needs to independently search, classify and decide 
either to attack the classified target or continue to search for new targets. 
 
 5
In the cooperative cases communication between the munitions are allowed. 
Individual munitions broadcast information regarding classification and attacks to the 
other agents of the group so every munition can be informed as to the progress of the all 
munitions. By using this shared information munitions cooperatively classify and decide 
whether an attack should be made on the target. Cooperative decision logic can also be 
used to determine which munitions attack classified targets and which continue to search.   
Modeling real life, as it is, is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore some 
simplifying assumptions needed to be made. All communication between munitions is 
reliable and on time. There is no communication delay, signal degradation or 
broadcasting errors, but erroneous information regarding incorrectly classified false 
targets is broadcasted. In this research all targets and non-targets are modeled as 
stationary. Unreliable, limited communication and mobile targets and non-targets are left 
as a recommendation for future studies. Various cooperative and non-cooperative 
scenarios are studied using 4 and 8 munition groups. Parameters used to define the 
scenarios and battlefield characteristics are shown in the test matrix in Appendix A.  
1.5 Relevance 
This study does not address any particular autonomous wide area search munition. 
A generic computer simulation is used to model the problem addressed in this study. 
Therefore this research and its results and conclusions can be applied any scenario with 
similar vehicle and battlefield characteristics by simply modifying the simulation 
parameters. Analytical theory presented in chapter 2 can be applied to a broad range of 
cooperative search algorithms. This study highlights the crucial decision parameters that 
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should be given special attention when evaluating the effectiveness of the autonomous 
wide area search munitions under cooperative behavior algorithms.   
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II. Autonomous Wide Area Search Munitions 
2.1 General 
Wide area search munitions can be described as autonomous vehicles which have 
the ability to carry warheads, relatively small onboard sensors to detect and classify 
targets, navigation systems (INS/GPS) to navigate through the search area, and 
communication systems to communicate with each other. In this research the munitions  
carry a single warhead that destroys the munition once detonated; they do not have the 
ability to drop individual bombs on targets. The Low Cost Autonomous Attack System 
(LOCAAS) is a very good example of wide area search vehicles that are under 
development. The LOCAAS is planned to be capable of wide area search, identification 
and destruction of mobile targets (13).  
There are various factors that play a big role in the effectiveness of the wide area 
search munitions. The most significant factors for overall performance of cooperative 
munitions are the communication, Automatic Target Recognition (ATR), and warhead 
lethality. For example, a poor ATR system will cause misclassification of the object and 
will result in excessive false target attacks and collateral damage. Likewise, bad 
communication broadcast to other munitions may cause other vehicles to react adversely 
since decisions will be based on bad information. 
According to Jacques (6) False Target Attack Rate (FTAR) and probability of 
target report (PT R) are the most important measures of ATR performance. FTAR can be 
defined as the average rate ( /km2) at which munitions would falsely declare targets if the 
seeker were flown in a non-commit mode. PTR is the probability of a correct Target 
Report given that a valid target is encountered in the search area. Some classical work in 
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the area of optimal search has been done by Koopman (8) and Washburn (11). In the 
following sections probabilities for successful search and attack will be examined in 
detail for single munition/single target, single munition/multi- target, and multi-
munition/multi- target cases based on Jacques’ studies (5)(7).  Prior to defining the 
probabilities of mission success it is necessary to discuss the ATR algorithm in greater 
detail.   
2.1.1 ATR Algorithm. The performance of an ATR system is determined by 
its’ ability to make the right decision when verifying the type of object (target or non-
target) that has been encountered. The process of making the right decision given target 
encounter is quantified by the probability of target report (PTR).  Jacques described the 
relationship of these probabilities and other ATR measures using a confusion matrix (7). 
A confusion matrix expresses a priori probabilities for discriminating between targets 
and non targets.  A binary confusion matrix is shown in Table 1 for the single target case 
(1). 
 
Table 1 Binary Confusion Matrix 
ENCOUNTERED OBJECT 
 DECLARED OBJECT 
 Target Non-Target 
Target PTR PFTA|E 
Non-Target 1-PTR 1-PFTA|E 
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Table 1 shows only a single target type. In addition to PTR, the confusion matrix requires 
the specification of PFTA|E, the probability of false target attack given encounter. This is 
the simplest case because it contains only a single target type, and any encountered object 
is either a target or non-target.  
In reality it is unrealistic to expect that munitions will encounter only one type 
of target. For example, there might be surface to air missile launchers, reloaders, and 
support vehicles in a battlefield scenario. An attack might be considered successful if any 
of these targets is attacked. Therefore, an ATR model must be capable of handling 
different types of targets. In order to handle the multiple target type case, an extension of 
the simple confusion matrix must be considered. The confusion matrix for an ATR 
capable of discriminating 3 different types of true targets from non-targets is shown in 
Table 2 (1). 
 
Table 2   Confusion Matrix for Multiple Target Types 
ENCOUNTERED OBJECT 
DECLARED 
OBJECT 
 
Target Type 1 
 
Target Type 2 
 
Target Type 3 
 
Non-Target 
Target Type 1 PTR 1|Type 1  PTR 1|Type 2  PTR 1|Type 3  PFTA1|E 
Target Type 2 PTR 2|Type 1  PTR 2|Type 2  PTR 2|Type 3  PFTA2|E 
Target Type 3 PTR 3|Type 1  PTR 3|Type 2  PTR 3|Type 3  PFTA3|E 
Non-Target 1-ΣPTRj | Type 1  1-ΣPTRj | Type 2  1-ΣPTRj | Type 3  1-ΣPFTAj | E  
     
The composite probability of target report can be determined by using the above 
confusion matrix for any target type. However, this time it is not a single value since a 
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target encountered by a munition can be classified as any type.  For example, if a 
munition is to encounter a target of Type 1, the probability that it would classify the 
target as a target of any type is the sum of PTR 1|Type 1, PTR 2|Type 1, PTR 3|Type 1 . Note that 
since any encountered target will either be declared some target type or disregarded as a 
non-target, the values in any single column must sum to one. 
2.2 Single Munition Single Target Case 
 
When a munition searches an area it is only able to see the part of the search area 
under its sensor footprint, assumed to be constant width in this research. A sample search 
pattern for the single munition/single target case is shown in Figure 1. For the simplest 
case, the search area, AS, contains a single target. For the rest of the chapter targets are 
considered as uniformly distributed within the search area in a Poisson field of false 
targets. The basic scenario will be the single munition/single target case. This basic 
scenario will be extended to a single munition/multi- target case and multi-  
munition/multi target case.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Sample Search Pattern 
 
A
As
dA Direction of Flight
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For the basic scenario, the single munition single target case, a single target is 
uniformly distributed in a Poisson field of false targets. The probability of mission 
success for the single munition, single target case can be expressed as: 
                                       PMS =PK .PTR .PE                              (2.1) 
where  
PK = the probability of target kill given that the target is classified as a valid target.   
PTR = probability of target report given the target is in the sensor footprint. 
PE = the probability the target will be encountered in the search area. 
In order to obtain the probability of mission success PK, PTR, and PE   values have 
to be determined. PK, can be expressed as single numerical values depending on the 
warhead lethality, and  PTR can be derived from the confusion matrix tables as discussed 
in section 2.1.1. 
  The probability that the munition will encounter the target  given that the target 
is in the search area, PE , can be determined from an integral formulation using the 
probabilities that the munition has not made previous false target declarations in the 
already searched area, 
FA
P , and the probability that the target is contained in the area dA. 
  A
FA
eP α−=                                                              (2.2) 
                                                 Pc(dA)=ηt . dA                       (2.3) 
where α is the false target attack rate and the ηt is the average target density for the 
search area. For the single target case,  ηt= 1/AS. As defined in the previous sections false 
target attack rate is the expected rate of false target declarations for the Sensor/ATR 
algorithm. It can be formulated as the product of the probability that the munition will 
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attack a false target given that it has been encountered, ( EFTAP | ), and the expected 
probability density of false targets ( FTη ).  
EFTAFT P |⋅= ηα                                                        (2.4) 
Therefore, the incremental probability that the munition will encounter the target in area 
dA can be expressed as: 
   dA
A
e
AP
s
A
E .)(
α−
=∆                                                 (2.5) 
The probability that the munition will encounter the target in the total search area can be 
obtained by integrating equation 2.5 over the search area AS yielding: 
 
s
A
sE A
e
AP
s
⋅
−
=
−
α
α1
)(                                                   (2.6) 
 
 
2.2.1 Outcome Trees. An outcome tree for the single munition/single target scenario  
showing the possible outcomes and their likelihoods is shown in Figure 2 (1). Solid lines 
represent desired outcomes, and dashed lines are the negative outcomes. While a 
munition is searching the area, it may either encounter the true target or not. If it 
encounters the true target, because of the uncertainty associated with the ATR process, it 
may either report it as a true target or a false target.  If the real target is recognized by the 
munition an attack will be executed on the target.  Although, there will be an attack on 
the target it may destroy the target or the target will survive in accordance with the 
lethality, PK, of the warhead.   
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Figure 2 Outcome Tree for  Autonomous Search 
 
If the real target is not recognized there is no remaining chance for a successful 
outcome for the single target case (assuming non-duplicative search pattern). Since there 
is no real target in the remaining search area the munition will run out of gas and destroy 
itself or execute an attack on a false target.  An alternative outcome is that the munition 
will make a false target declaration prior to encountering the real target. Consequently, 
the munition can execute an attack on the false target being recognized as a valid one.   
The likelihood of any specific outcome can be determined by simply taking the 
product of the possibilities along the path of that branch.  The probability of successful 
search is the left branch of the outcome tree. Analytically it can be shown as:   
 
PSS = PK .PTR.PE = PMS = PK .PTR. 
s
A
A
e s
.
1
α
α−−
    (2.7) 
Search 
PE(U 1-PE(tr; 
Enc. Tgt 
TR 1-P Tft 
Enc. Tgt 
Tgt. Rpt. 
^.1-P, 
Tgt. KIM Miss        False Tgt.       Out of 
Rpt. Gas 
^ N 
^ V 
False Tgt 
Kill 
MISS 
False Tgt 
Rpt. 
False Tgt 
KIM 
Miss 
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When a target is reported by the ATR of a different munition it may be a real 
target or a false target.  The probability that a second attack on the declared object will 
result in a successful target kill can be determined by looking at the outcome tree for the 
attack Figure 3 (5).   
 
 
 
Figure 3 Outcome Tree for  Cooperative  Attack   
 
The probability of a successful attack, lethal attack on a real target, is the most left branch 
of the Figure 3. 
PSS = TRRTP | . PTR . PK      (2.8) 
where TRRTP | is the   probability that a declared target is actually a real target given that it is 
reported. TRRTP |  can be expressed as the ratio of the true target attack rate to total attack 
rate. 
FTEFTATTR
TTR
TRRT PP
P
P
ηη
η
⋅+⋅
⋅
=
|
|                                                    (2.9) 
Tgt. Rpt. 
RT|TR ""'■"---    1-R RTTTR 
Real Tgt 
"■■'■-..  1-P. 
Tgt. Rpt Search 
False Tgt 
> ^ '■..    1 p 
FTiNE / \       '   ~ 
Tgt. Rpt Search 
FTflJE 
\    1-P 
Tgt Kill Miss 
False Tgt. Miss 
Kill 
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In the search area there is only one target and once it is not recognized by munition’s 
ATR system, the probability of continuing to search for the target will be zero resulting 
outcomes of all the other branches to be zero as well.  
2.3 Single Munition Multi-Target Case 
 
A single munition searching for multiple targets can be looking for multiple 
targets of the same type, multiple targets of different types or a specific target between a 
numbers of different valid targets.  The ability to distinguish between different target 
types is again determined by the capability of the munitions’ ATR system. When the 
munition is searching for a specific target among the other types of targets, these other 
types of targets can simply be considered as false targets and the theory developed for the 
single munition/single target case can be applied safely.  
In the case of a single munition searching for different types of targets, all target 
types are considered valid. Modifications must be made from the set up of the single 
munition/single target case to handle this scenario. For the single munition/single target 
case the incremental probability that the munition will encounter the target in area dA was 
shown to be the product of the  probabilities that munition has had no false alarms in the 
already searched area, 
FA
P , and the target is contained in the area dA. For the multi target 
scenario there are other valid targets in the search area and the incremental probability of 
target encounter also depends on the probability of not attacking a target within the 
already search area. This probability can be expressed as:  
AP
RT
TRteP η−=                                                           (2.10) 
Thus the incremental probability for target encounter in dA is the product of the 
probability that the munition has had no false alarms in the already searched area,
FA
P , the 
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probability that the target is contained in the area dA, and the probability of not having a 
previously declared  target within the already search area. 
 dAeAP t
AP
E
TRt ⋅⋅=∆ +− ηαη )()(                                               (2.11) 
 
Finally 2.11 can be integrated over the entire area to obtain the total probability of target 
encounter for the entire search area: 
)1()( )( sTRt AP
TRt
t
SE eP
AP αη
αη
η +−−⋅
+
=                                        (2.12) 
 
 The probability of target report can be determined by using the confusion matrix. 
However, since a target encountered by the munition can be classified as any type, it 
cannot be taken directly from the confusion matrix as it was for the single target type 
case. The probability that an encountered target of type i will be declared as a target of 
any type can be defined as: 
∑=
j
iTypeTRjTRi PP _|                                                  (2.13) 
 
where j ranges from one to the  number of target types being considered in the ATR 
algorithm. When a munition encounters a target, the probability that this encountered 
target will be type i can be defined as: 
tgtstotal
ti
EiP
_η
η
=                                                        (2.14) 
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By using equations 2.13 and 2.14 a combined PTR weighted by the average densities of 
the various target types can then be stated as: 
∑ ⋅=
i
EiTRiTR PPP                                                    (2.15) 
2.4 Multi-Munition Multi-Target Case 
 
 The analytical studies for the single munition single/target case can still be 
applicable to the multi munition/multi target cases. Jacques showed the analytical tools 
for the multi-munition case with single targets and extension of these to the multi-  
munition/multi- target case (5). For the multi-munition/multi- target case, munitions may 
still search the area individually, so these searches can be considered independently.  
Probability of successful search is the same as the single munition/single target case. 
However, munitions can also execute attacks on targets declared by other munitions.  
The probability of successful attack is affected by the other munitions’ 
contribution since individual munitions can execute attacks on the targets declared by 
another munition. However, its own ATR may or may not recognize it as a target once it 
is encountered for itself. If not, it may continue to search and can attack successfully 
another target declared by another munition or find another valid target. By using the 
outcome tree shown at Figure 3, the probability of a successful attack can be shown as 
(5): 
 
+⋅−⋅−+⋅⋅= TRRTTRETArSSTRRTTRKsa PPttPPPPP || )1()(  
                       )1()1()( || TRRTFTEFTAETArSS PPttP −⋅−⋅−                                     (2.16) 
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Different than the single target case, this time there is more than one target in the search 
area and continuing to search can produce positive outcomes.  
 
2.5 Applying Cooperative Algorithm to This Research 
2.5.1 Non-Cooperative Cases. The goal of this research is to evaluate the 
effectiveness of cooperative behavior in wide area search munitions. In order to 
accomplish this goal, the performance of cooperative munitions  must be compared with 
the performance of the non-cooperative munitions. Cooperative cases and non-
cooperative cases are considered using the same conditions and parameters through 
various scenarios.  
 Munitions act individually in non-cooperative cases. A munition searches by 
itself looking for possible targets. When it encounters an object, it classifies it as either 
target or non-target by using its ATR system, and when a classification is made it decides 
whether to execute an attack on the target or continue searching for another target. 
Munitions will not attack any of the targets that have been classified by any other 
vehicles unless they are encountered during their individual search. This must be the case 
since they do not have any knowledge of targets found by other munitions.   
2.5.2 Cooperative Cases. In cooperative cases munitions act as a group to 
accomplish the tasks and maximize the overall benefit for the system. Munitions 
communicate with each other and they classify the object cooperatively using 
confirmatory looks. When a classification is made, they decide whether or not an attack 
should be made on the target, and if an attack is to be made which munition will be 
assigned to attack. 
 
 19
Benefit calculations  will be used to decide which actions to take, and possible 
tasks are assigned to the vehicles in a way to optimize overall benefit of the group. These 
possible tasks are confirming the classification of the object, executing an attack on a 
classified target, or continuing to search for other valid targets. The benefit calculations 
will be probabilities of success based on the outcomes of search and attack, and their 
implementation will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20
III. Simulation Program 
The MultiUAV simulation used in this research was developed by AFRL/VACA as a 
development tool for their research on cooperative vehicles. MultiUAV can simulate 
multiple unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) which can cooperatively act to accomplish a 
predetermined task (10).  MultiUAV was developed using Matlab, Simulink and 
Microsoft Visual C++ (MSVC++)(12). The MultiUAV simulation obtained from VACA 
was modified to implement some of the objectives of this research. These modifications 
and the specifications of the original simulation will be discussed in this chapter. 
MultiUAV is still under continuous deve lopment. 
3.1 Original Simulation  
       3.1.1 General. The original simulation developed by AFRL/VACA was 
capable of simulating eight vehicles searching an area that contains a maximum of ten 
targets. Simulated vehicles have embedded flight software (EFS) that can be used to 
implement cooperative control algorithms and vehicle dynamics. MultiUAV offers tools 
for plotting the simulation results, and saving data for playback and animation (10). 
 The number of the vehicles can be changed from 1 to 8 by using a graphical user 
interface (GUI) provided by the simulation. Increasing the number of vehicles requires 
complex procedures and is beyond the scope of this research. AFRL has immediate plans 
to make connections between vehicles in MultiUAV more flexible so that users can add 
additional vehicles to the simulation (10).  
Simulation begins by the random placement of the targets in the search area and the 
placement of the autonomous vehicles at their initial positions. The vehicles then fly 
specified routes to search the area for possible targets. When an object enters a vehicle’s 
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field of regard it is detected by the sensor of the vehicle and a classification is made as a 
real target or a non target. A confidence of correct classification for the object is assigned 
depending on the angle from which the target is viewed by the vehicle. This confidence 
level has an effect on the task assignment for cooperative munitions because a specified 
level of confidence must be attained before any attack can occur. 
There are certain tasks that a vehicle can perform after classification of the object. 
These tasks are assigned in a way to maximize the overall benefit (10) (12). 
• Continue searching ( If the object is classified as a non-target or 
the calculated benefit of search is greater than the attack benefit) 
• Attack (Execute an attack on the object that has been  classified as 
a target) 
• Reclassify ( If the confidence in target classification is less than the 
predetermined threshold ) 
•  Verify (Perform Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)). 
Vehicles continue to perform these assigned tasks until the total simulation time is 
expired, at which time the simulation terminates. For this research, a total simulation time 
of 1200 seconds was used.   
       3.1.2 Task Assignments.  Task assignments are determined by implementing a 
network optimization model. Currently the simulation uses  a Capacitated Transshipment 
Problem (CTP), a special case of linear programming, to perform the task allocation 
routine. Tasks are assigned to the munitions in a way that maximizes the overall benefits 
to the multi-munition system. The capacitated transshipment problem is solved every 
time when a change occurs in a target state, or when specified time intervals are reached. 
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As listed in the previous section, possible tasks are to continue searching, attack, 
reclassify, and verify. 
       3.1.3 Automatic Target Recognition Algorithm.  When a vehicle encounters 
an object in the original Simulation, it classifies the object based on truth information. It 
then calculates a confidence level for the classification that has been made depending on 
the view angle for the object. Vehicles are not allowed to misclassify the objects, thus 
eliminating any possibility for false target attack. Although we would certainly like to 
minimize the number of false targets attacks, it is unreasonable to expect that we can 
entirely eliminate the possibility of occurrence.  
Once classified, a calculated confidence level is compared with the predetermined 
threshold. If the confidence level is less than the threshold another vehicle may be 
assigned to classify the object depending on the benefit calculation results. Confidence 
levels for individual vehicles are then combined into a single value and this new metric 
will be compared to the threshold. The object stays detected but not classified until the 
confidence becomes greater than the threshold.   
It is not possible to have a perfect ATR algorithm. There will be some errors in the 
ATR system of a real munition and this error should be modeled within the simulation. 
Modifications to the ATR algorithm of the simulation will be discussed in section 3.2.7.  
       3.1.4 Warhead Lethality.  When a vehicle executes an attack on a target, the 
target is considered as dead if the bomb drops within a predetermined radius from the 
target. While this is not an unreasonable approach for large general purpose bombs, the 
fidelity of the simulation is insufficient to assess the guidance accuracy and the precise 
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pointing required for small warheads. An alternative approach to modeling lethality will 
be used as described in the next section. 
3.1.5 Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).  After a target has been attacked, 
another vehicle may be assigned to perform BDA. Since all attacks result in a kill in the 
original simulation the vehicle that performs the BDA merely confirms the kill. Having 
100% warhead lethality and perfect BDA sensor results in the loss of search time only. 
There is never any misinformation introduced by the BDA process. This issue also will 
be discussed in the next section.  
3.1.6 Communications.  In the original simulation communications are global 
and reliable. Information is available to all vehicles and there are no errors, loss or bad 
information broadcasted between the vehicles.  Only the truth information is broadcast 
between vehicles, and vehicles decide cooperatively what to do based on this perfect 
information. Decisions and task assignments are made based on this truth information.  
 
 3.2 Simulation Modifications  
  In order to adapt the simulation program to the objectives of this research there 
were several required modifications. The modifications are listed below and will be 
discussed in more detail in the following subsections. 
• Increasing the maximum number of targets 
• Adding logic to separate sensed information from truth information  
• ATR algorithm modifications 
• Adding warhead lethality options 
• Benefit and task assignment calculations 
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• Battle damage assessment 
• Obtaining the desired statistical data  
3.2.1 Modifying Maximum Number of Targets. For the purposes of this 
research targets are uniformly distributed in a uniform field of false targets. While the 
analytical results of the previous section assumed a Poisson field of false targets, this 
research fixed the number of non-target objects, and uniformly distributed them on the 
battlefield. In order to employ false targets as well as real targets the maximum number 
of the targets needed to be increased. The maximum number of targets increased from 10 
to 32 to accommodate the desired number of the real targets and false targets. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, FTAR is the product of the probability that the vehicle 
will attack an encountered false target and the average density of the non-targets in the 
search area.  The probability of target declaration and attack is determined by the 
confusion matrix entries, and the non-target density adjusted by adding or removing non-
targets. 
         Distinguishing between the target types and target priorities is also considered 
an important factor that should be used to evaluate the effectiveness of cooperative 
behavior. If munitions come across a low priority target and choose to attack in the early 
stages of the search, they may miss higher probability targets elsewhere in the searchable 
area. Two types of targets were used in this research; high and low priority targets. Two 
high priority and four low priority targets are employed along with 26 false targets, 
resulting ?FT = 0.1. 
3.2.2 Separation of Truth and Sensed Information. In the original simulation 
truth information is broadcast between vehicles. Task assignments, classification of 
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targets, benefit calculations and targets states are all based on truth information. As a 
result, decisions made will also be depending on the same truth information.  Although 
the truth information affects the overall simulation results and effectiveness of 
cooperative behavior of the vehicles in a positive way, it is not realistic to expect the 
availability of truth information on the battlefield. Therefore, the favorable results 
obtained are an overly optimistic prediction. 
 In real life it is not certain that truth information will be obtained. There are 
sometimes errors in identification or loss of information. Dunkel (1) made some 
modifications; as an extension to this work logic was added to the simulation to further 
distinguish between truth and sensed information. The simulation keeps track of the 
sensed information generated by the vehicles as well as the truth information. For the 
purposes of this research, benefit calculations, task assignments and decisions are made 
according to sensed information. The accuracy of the sensed information broadcast 
between cooperative munitions will affect the overall results of the simulation much more 
so than for the case of non-cooperative munitions. For cooperative cases the effect is 
more detrimental since the bad information will be used by not only the vehicle that 
created the incorrect information, but also the other vehicles making decisions based on 
it. This will affect the overall performance of the cooperative behavior algorithms. For 
the case of no-cooperation these effects may be less significant because bad information 
will be used only by the vehicle which declared it in the first place.  
3.2.3 Automatic Target Recognition Algorithm Modifications.  While 
evaluating the effectiveness of cooperative behavior in wide area search munitions false 
target attacks due to the misidentification of objects must be considered as a major 
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performance measure (6). False target attacks cause the loss of valuable munitions and 
result in collateral damage, hence raising political and moral implications. False target 
attacks are caused by misidentification of a non-target as a real target, and it is very 
important to account for the possibility of these false classifications in a simulation 
designated for the evaluation of cooperative vehicle effectiveness. 
ATR errors enter into the simulation program through the confusion matrices 
described in chapter II, and as defined in the simulation. When a vehicle encounters an 
object, the object will be classified based on the result of a function call which uses true 
target types, a random number draw and probability entries in the confusion matrix. This 
final classification is used for benefit calculation and task allocation. By adjusting the 
probabilities in the confusion matrix different ATR performance levels can be modeled. 
By letting vehicles misidentify objects the ATR algorithm is more realistic to actual 
battlefield characteristics. 
3.2.4 Warhead Lethality. Modifications were made to implement various low 
lethality warheads. Fifty percent and eighty percent numbers for warhead lethality are 
used in both no cooperation and cooperative classification and engagement scenarios. 
The attack outcome is determined using a random draw and the warhead lethality figure, 
PK. PK represents a probability of kill given initiation of attack, and it includes a 
composite of guidance accuracy, warhead reliability, and lethality given hit on the target. 
 When a munition executes an attack on a target, a random draw is made and is 
compared to the PK value that is hard coded depending on the scenario.  If the random 
number is less than the probability of kill, then the target is considered as killed. However 
this information is not passed to the other vehicles since the attacking vehicle is already 
 
 27
dead. Therefore, the other vehicles only know that an attack has been made on that 
particular target but they do not have any information regarding the success of attack. A 
previous attack is used as a degrading factor for the attack benefit calculations and will be 
discussed in the related subsection. 
3.2.5 Battle Damage Assessment. For the scope of this research the BDA task 
is eliminated by setting the task value of performing BDA to zero.  
3.2.6 Benefit and Task Assignment Calculations . The original simulation uses 
heuristics benefit calculations. In this research a new benefit calculation method proposed 
by Dunkel is used (1). This approach bases the task benefits on the probabilities of 
successful attack and search derived in chapter II. A formula for the calculation of search 
benefit can be expressed as: 
Search Benefit = ssP⋅ξ                                               (3.1) 
where Pss is the probability of successful search and ξ  is a weighting factor.  The 
weighting parameter ξ  is the relative advantage of continuing to search for new targets 
over executing an attack on an already known target, and can vary between 0 and 1. 
When ξ  is 0 the search benefit will be zero and it will never be beneficial to search for 
additional targets. On the other hand, vehicles will always continue to search for 
additional targets rather than attacking the known ones when ξ is 1. Dunkel used this 
weighting function to fine-tune the performance of the cooperative multi-munition 
system (1). 
Various factors affect the task value and probability of a successful attack such as; 
probability of the target being alive, time needed by the vehicle to reach the target, the 
probability that the target classification is correct, and different types of targets and target 
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priorities. While the outcomes of previous attacks are known within the simulation, this 
information is not passed to the other vehicles since the attacking vehicle is already dead. 
Therefore, the other vehicles only know that an attack has been made on that particular 
target. One vehicle can execute an attack on a target that has already been attacked by 
another vehicle, but the probability of a target being alive after n previous attack is used 
as a degrading factor in the benefit calculation. This prevents an excessive number of 
attacks on already attacked targets. Assuming independent events the probability that a 
target is still alive after n attacks have been made on the target   can be expressed as: 
P alive|n attacks = (1 -PK ) n                                         (3.2) 
Varying target priorities is also an important factor that should be considered for 
attack benefit calculations. For this research two types of real targets are assumed to exist 
on the battlefield. Target Type 1 is considered a high priority target and Target Type 2 is 
considered a low priority target.  A weighting parameter, β  is used in benefit calculations 
to reflect the value of low priority targets relative to that of high priority targets. When β 
equals 1 low priority targets will be as valuable as high priority targets, and the benefits 
of attacking either target will be the same. For this research a fixed value of 0.5 is used 
for the weighting parameter β . Attack benefit formulas can be expressed as: 
Target Type 1:      Attack Benefit = (1 - ξ) . (1 -PK ) n . Psa                                           (3.3) 
Target Type 2:      Attack Benefit = (1 - ξ) . β .(1 -PK ) n . Psa                                          (3.4) 
Non-Target (False Target):     Attack Benefit = 0                                                    (3.5) 
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where (1 - ξ) is the weighting parameter associated with attacking a target rather than 
continuing to search for additional targets. As it can be seen the weighting parameter for 
attacking a target is the complement of the weighting parameter for search, ξ.  Ιncreasing 
the value of ξ, reduces the attack benefits.  
3.2.7 Obtaining the Desired Statistical Data and Other Modifications.  In 
order to obtain the desired statistical data some modifications were made. For the 
purposes of this study, the number of real targets kills, number of false targets kills, 
number of attacks executed on real and false targets and number of  total attacks 
(including multiple attacks on a target or false target) were gathered. In addition to 
modifications mentioned in this chapter, there are other modifications made to change the 
simulation parameters easily without affecting the actual simulation algorithm. 
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IV. Simulation Results and Analysis 
In this research the effectiveness of autonomous wide area search munitions is 
investigated by applying cooperative and non-cooperative behavior algorithms under 
various scenarios.  These scenarios are defined by several parameters:  
1. Warhead lethality 
2. ATR performance   
3. Search weight 
4. Number of munitions and targets 
5. False target attack rate (FTAR) 
Other parameters such as search rate and search patterns are held constant in this 
research. While warhead lethality, and ATR capability depend on the munition’s 
technical features, the number of munitions and search weight are determined by the 
operational concepts and tactics. Two other characteristics related to the search area 
(battlefield) specifications are the target and false target densities. As discussed in 
previous chapters these densities are kept constant with six real targets (two Type 1, four 
Type 2) and 26 false targets in the search area. The specific parameters that are varied in 
the simulation are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 Specific Simulation Parameters 
 
PK Probability of kill 0.5, 0.8 
PTR Probability of target report 0.8, 0.95  
FTAR False target attack rate  0.002, 0.02 
NM Number of munitions 4, 8 
? Search Weight 0.25, 0.42 
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The number of attacks made by munitions on real or false targets and the lethality of 
those attacks are the key elements for mission success and effectiveness, and 
subsequently the performance of cooperative and non-cooperative wide area search 
munitions. The specific responses selected are number of killed targets,  total  number of 
attacks on false targets, total number of attacks, number of false targets attacked, number 
of real targets attacked, and the number of attacks executed on high and low priority 
targets. Finally, a hit formula that assigns 2 points to a priority one target kill, 1 point for 
a priority two target and -1 point for a false target attack is calculated. The following 
sections present the performance of cooperative and non-cooperative algorithms for 
varying values of the munition and scenario parameters. 
Cooperative cases and non-cooperative cases are considered under the same 
conditions and parameters through various scenarios.  Munitions act individually in non- 
cooperative cases. A munition searches by itself looking for possible targets. When it 
encounters an object, it classifies the target by using ATR system, and when a 
classification is made it decides whether to execute an attack on the target or continue 
searching for another target. Non-cooperative munitions will not attack any of the targets 
that have been classified by any other vehicles unless they are encountered during their 
individual search. In cooperative cases munitions act as a group to accomplish the tasks 
and maximize the overall benefit for the system. Munitions communicate with each other 
and classify the object cooperatively. When a classification is made, they decide whether 
or not an attack should be made on the target, and if an attack is to be made which 
munition will be assigned to attack. According to benefit calculations munitions decide 
which actions to take and possible tasks are assigned to the vehicles in a way to optimize 
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overall benefit of the group. These possible tasks are reclassifying the object, executing 
an attack on a classified target or continuing to search for other valid targets.  
4.1 Warhead Lethality Effects  
Warhead lethality is one of the most important factors in determining the 
performance of the munitions. In this section the performance of cooperative and non-
cooperative munitions will be examined by applying low and high warhead lethality into 
the simulation.  
 Table 4 shows the performance of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior for 
a low warhead lethality (PK =0.5).  Except in three of the scenarios, non-cooperative 
behavior resulted in more real target kills than the cooperative behavior. Cooperative 
behavior did not improve the number of killed targets; actually there is a decrease in 
number of kills between 2 to 57 percent through the different scenarios. These results are 
similar to those of Dunkel (1).  
 
Table 4 Number of Killed Targets/False Target Attacks at Low Warhead Lethality 
 
 
 
No-coo aeration Cooperation ftofKiUs 
Improvement 
False Target 
Attack Decrease PK FTAR i^Mumtion PTR Weighty ftofKiUs a of FT A ftofKiUs a of FT A 
05 
0 002 
4 
0.3 
0 42 0 5500 0 1000 0 2S33 0 -43 5% -100 0% 
0 25 1 2333 0 2000 0 7333 0 -405% -1000% 
0 95 
0 42 ObSOO 0 0667 0 4500 0 -30 8% -100 0% 
0 25 13667 0 1833 10333 0 -20 7% -100 0% 
3 
08 
0 42 0 3557 0 2500 0 4500 0 -43 1% -100 0% 
0 25 2 2167 0 5333 1 4500 0 -34 6% -100 0% 
0.95 
042 0 9500 0 2833 0 6167 0 -35]% -100 0% 
025 2 5833 0 4333 21333 0 -17 4% -100 0% 
0 02 
4 
08 
042 0 5000 10667 0 2167 01667 -56 7% -34 4% 
0 25 0.3000 17557 0.5557 0.2557 -16 7% -34 9% 
0.95 
0 42 0 6333 1 0000 0 2333 0 1500 -35 0% 
0 25 0 9333 16500 0 9500 0 2833 18% -82 8% 
8 
08 
0 42 0 8500 2 4000 0 4167 0 3000 -51 0% -87 5% 
025 15000 3 5667 16667 0 5167 4 2% -355% 
0 95 
0.42 0 3657 2 3333 0 5157 0 2167 -40 4% -90.9% 
0 25 1 3333 3 2500 1 3667 0 6333 1 3% -30 5% 
OVERALL PREFORMANCE 1 152033 1 195333 0 351453333 015333333 -25 2% -353% 
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Cooperative behavior has significantly decreased the number of False Target 
Attacks (FTA). While non-cooperative munitions attack significant numbers of false 
targets, the cooperative munitions execute very few attacks on false targets. This is not a 
surprising result. Since cooperative munitions classify targets cooperatively, the effective 
false target attack rate is reduced. This also partially explains the decrease in real target 
attacks; the cooperative behavior effectively reduces the probability of correct target 
report.  There is an 86.8% decrease in the false target attacks as a result of cooperative 
behavior. This is a promising improvement for wide area search munitions.  
Table 5 shows the performance of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior for 
high warhead lethality (PK =0.8). Non-cooperative munitions again kill more real targets 
than the cooperative munitions for all given scenarios. The decrease in number of killed 
targets varies between 15 to 48 percent throughout the different scenarios. Overall, the 
decrease in the number of killed targets for high warhead lethality cases is 29.3%. 
Cooperative behavior was less beneficial in high warhead lethality cases than it was for 
low lethality cases. This is because there is less need for multiple attacks on a real target 
in order to achieve a target kill. High warhead lethality reduces the benefit of executing 
additional attacks on previously attacked targets. Recall the factor (1-PK)n from previous 
chapters. As a result, munitions prefer to attack targets that have not previously been 
attacked as they would under non-cooperative conditions.  
While the decrease in real target kills is regrettable, it may be an acceptable trade for 
some scenarios given the significant reduction in false target attacks and collateral 
damage.  Of interest is that the combination of low PK and higher FTAR are the scenarios 
 
 34
where cooperative behavior is most beneficial. Further, this scenario is the most likely for 
a small, low cost-munition. 
 
Table 5 Number of Killed Targets/False Target Attacks at High Warhead Lethality 
 
 
4.2 ATR Capability Effects  
The automatic target recognition system is used by munitions to identify the 
object they encounter while searching the battlefield for valid targets. The ability of a 
munition to correctly identify the objects is defined by the probability of target report 
(PTR), as described in chapter II. In this section the effects of PTR on the performance of 
the cooperative and non-cooperative munitions will be discussed.  
The performance of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior for low ATR 
capability (PTR = 0.8) is shown in Table 6, and high ATR capability (PTR = 0.95) is 
shown in Table 7. 
 
 
tJo-CO operation Coopeiilion JJofKiUs 
[mpiovemeni 
False Target 
Attack Decrease FK FTAR JJMunilion FTP. Weighty JJofMls JJofFTA HofKjJls JJofFTft 
oa 
0 002 
4 
08 
0 42 0B167 0 1000 0 4333 0 ■46 9% ■100 0% 
0 25 2 0167 0 2167 1 1S33 0 ■41 3% '100 0% 
095 
0 42 1 0333 0 0667 0 6500 0 '37 1% '100 0% 
0 25 2 2333 0 2000 16167 0 -29 2% '100 0% 
a 
oa 0 42 1 2333 0 2500 07167 n -41 9% -100 0% 
0 25 31667 0 4333 2 2500 0 -20 '^"'^ -100 0% 
0 95 
0 42 1.4333 0 2333 0 9667 0 -^2 6^'n -100.0% 
0 25 3 3333 0 3667 3 0333 0 -21 9% -100 0% 
0 02 
4 
03 0 42 
0 7167 10667 0 3667 01667 -48 8% -84 4% 
0 25 1 4667 18167 10500 0 2667 -28 4% -85 3% 
096 
0 42 0 9167 1 0000 0 4833 01500 -47 3% -85 0% 
0 25 1 7000 1 6333 1 4500 0 2333 -14 7% -36 1% 
a 
08 
0 42 1 1667 2 4000 0 6333 0 3000 -41 4% -37 5% 
025 2 7667 3 5667 2 2000 0 5667 -20 5% -34 1% 
0 95 
0 42 13000 2 3333 0 3333 0 2167 -32 1% -90 9% 
0 25 3 0333 3 1333 2 5333 0 4667 -17 3% -35 3% 
OVERALL PREFORMANCE 1 311453 1 133542 1 23125 0 14791657 '29.3% -37 6% 
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Table 6 Number of Killed Targets/False Target Attacks at Low ATR Capability 
 
 
Table 7 Number of Killed Targets/False Target Attacks at High ATR Capability 
 
 
The high ATR capability scenarios for both non-cooperative and cooperative 
munitions achieved better results as compared to the low ATR capability cases. ATR 
systems with high PTR  produce more certain classification of the objects leading to a 
reduction in missed targets. Of note, cooperative behavior was more beneficial for cases 
N 0-CO op f ration Co op f cation « of Kills 
Improvement 
False Target 
Attack Decrease PTR PK FTAR ^Munitign Weighty ^gfKiUs U of FT A tf ofKiUs U of FT A 
03 
05 
0 002 
4 
0 42 0 5500 0 1000 0 2B33 0 '48 5% '100 0% 
0 25 1 2333 0 2000 0 7333 0 '40 5% '100 0% 
a 0 42 oaaaz 0 2500 0 4500 0 '46 1% '100 0% 
0 25 2 2167 0 5333 1 4500 0 -34 6% -100 0% 
0 02 
4 
0 42 oai67 0 1000 0 4333 0 -46 9% -100 0% 
0 25 2 0167 0 2167 1 1333 0 -41 3% -100 0% 
b 
0 42 1 2333 0 2500 0 7167 0 -41 9% -100 0% 
0 25 3 1337 0 4333 2 26GG G -23 9% -103 0% 
08 
GGG2 
4 0 42 0 5000 10G67 G21G7 01667 -56 7% -84.4% 
0 25 0 8000 17G67 0 6667 0 2667 -16 7% -84 9% 
8 
0 42 0 8500 2 4000 0 4167 0 3000 -51.0% '87 5% 
0 25 1 6000 3 5667 16667 0 5167 4 7% '05 5% 
0 02 
4 
0 42 0 7167 1 0667 0 3667 0 1667 '46 a% '84 4% 
0 25 1 4667 1 ai67 1 0500 0 2667 '2a 4% '35 3% 
a 0 42 1 1667 2 4000 0 6633 0 3000 -41 4% -87 5% 
0 25 27Ei."       . ..-."         __ -.." -84 1% 
OVERALL PREFCRMANCE 1 37;'-'    ■                         ■--■ - ,    -■  - .. -87 1% 
No-CO operation Coapei^Lion 
Imptovement 
FdseT^get 
Attack Decrease PTTL FK FTAR ittMunition Weighty ftofKiUs it of FT A it of Kill5 it of FT A 
0 95 
0 5 
0 002 
4 0 42 0 6500 0 0667 0 4500 0 -30 8% -100 0% 
0 25 1 3667 0 1833 1 0833 0 ■20 7% '100 0% 
3 0 42 0 9500 0 2333 0 6167 0 -351% -100 0% 
0 25 2 5833 0 4333 21333 0 -17.J% -100 0% 
0 02 
4 0 42 10333 0 0667 0 6500 0 -371% '100 0% 
0 25 2 2833 0 2000 1 6167 0 -29 2% -100 0% 
3 0 42 14333 0 2333 
0 9337 0 -32 3% -100 0% 
0 25 3 8833 0 3667 3 0333 0 '21 9% '100 0% 
08 
0.002 
4 0 42 0 6333 10000 0 2833 0 1500 '55 3% '85 0% 
0 25 0 9333 16500 0 9500 0 2333 1.8% -62.8% 
8 0 42 0 8667 2 3833 0 5167 0 2167 '404% -90.9% 
0 25 1 8333 3 2500 1 8667 0 6333 18% '605% 
0 02 
4 0 42 0 9167 10000 0 4333 0 1500 -47 3% -35 0% 
0 25 17000 16833 14500 0 2333 -14 7% -861% 
8 0 42 13000 2 3833 0 8833 0 2167 ■321% '90 9% 
0 25 3 0833 3 1833 2 5333 0 4667 -17 3% -35 3% 
OVERALL PREFORMANCE                 || ^ 590625 \ \sm2 ^ 2^979^667 0.U6875 -233% '87 2% 
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of high PTR than it was for low PTR. While the average false target attack decrease was not 
sufficiently different for the two cases, (87.2% vs. 87.1%), the decrease in real target 
attacks was significantly less for the high PTR  case (-23.3%) than it was for the low PTR  
case (32.8%). 
4.3 Effects of Number of Munitions  
The performance of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior for 4 and 8 
munitions is examined in this section. Simulation results for 4 munition scenarios are 
shown in Table 8, and the 8 munition results are shown in Table 9.  It is seen that there is 
32.5% percent decrease in number of targets killed and 86.2% less false targets attacks 
for 4 munitions scenarios and  24.9% percent decrease in number of targets and 87.6% 
less false targets attacks for 8 munitions scenarios. 
 
Table 8 Number of Killed Targets/False Target Attacks for 4 Munitions  
 
 
 
 
Ho-coopenLiofj Coopnalion tfofKills False Target 
AlUck Decrease VMuDJlJon FTAR PK PlR Wd^^ jVofKiUs tfofFTA jVofKilb tfofFTA 
4 
0.002 
0.5 
0.G 
0.42 05500 01000 0283333 0 -48.5% -100.0% 
0.25 1.2333 0.2000 0.733333 0 -40.5% -100.0% 
0.95 
043 06500 00667 045 0 -308% -1000% 
0.25 13667 0.1833 0 -20.7% '100.0% 1.083333 
0.8 
0.8 
0.42 08167 0.1000 0.433333 0 -46.9% '100.0% 
0.25 2.0167 0.2167 1.183333 0 41.3% -100.0% 
0.95 
0.42 1.0333 0.0667 0.65 0 '37.1% '100.0% 
025 22833 02000 1616667 0 -292% -1000% 
0.02 
0.5 
0.8 
0.42 0.5000 1.0667 0.216667 0.166667 ■56.7% '84.4% 
025 08000 17667 0666667 0366667 -167% -84 9% 
0.95 
0.42 0.6333 1.0000 0.15 '55.3% '85.0% 0.283333 
0.35 0.9333 1G5DD 095 0 283333 18% -828% 
0.8 
0.8 
0.42 0.7167 1.0667 0.366667 0166667 -48 8% -84.4% 
0.25 1.4GG7 1.8167 1.05 0.266667 '28.4% '85.3% 
095 
042 0.9167 1.0000 0.483333 015 -47 3% -850% 
0.25 1.7000 1.6833 1.45 0.233333 -14.7% -86.1% 
OVERALL PREFORMANCE 1.101 W2 0.761458 0.74375 0.105208 -32.5% -86.2% 
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Table 9 Number of Killed Targets/False Target Attacks for 8 Munitions 
 
The ratio of killed targets to the number of munitions represents the effectiveness 
of the munitions. For non-cooperative 4 munition and 8 munition scenarios, the 
effectiveness is 27.5% and 23.2% respectively. And for cooperative 4 and 8 munition 
scenarios the effectiveness of the munition is 18.5% and 17.4% respectively. The 
effectiveness of munitions for both cooperative and non-cooperative 8 munitions 
scenarios is lower than the 4 munition scenarios. Note, however, that there is less of a 
reduction in effectiveness due to the cooperation when greater numbers of munitions are 
available. 
4.4 Search Weight Effects  
Table 10 shows the performance of cooperative and non- cooperative behavior 
when they operate under low search weight, and Table 11 shows similar results for the 
cases where a high search weight was used. It is seen that search weight has a very 
important effect on the number of attacks for both cooperative and non-cooperative 
No-cooperalioii CciopejaUciji 
Jmpiovement 
FdseTajget 
Attack Decrease JJMunilion FTAR FK FTR Weighty JJ of KiUs JJ of FT A JJofKiUs fl of FT A 
e 
0 002 
05 
OS 0 42 0G667 0 2500 0 4500 0 -4G1% -100 0% 
0 25 2 2167 0 5333 1 4500 0 ■34 6% -100 0% 
0.95 
0 42 0 9500 0 2633 0 6167 0 -351% -100 0% 
0 25 2 5G33 0 4333 21333 0 -17 4% -100 0% 
O.S 
oe 0 42 1 2333 0 2500 0 7167 0 41 9% -100 0% 
0.25 31667 0.4333 2 2500 0 -26.9% -100 0% 
0 95 
0 42 14333 0 2G33 0 9667 0 '32 6% -100 0% 
0 25 3 6633 0 3667 3 0333 0 -21 9% ■100 0% 
0.02 
05 
O.S 0 42 0 6500 2.4000 
0 4167 0 3000 -51 0% -67.5% 
0 25 16000 3 5667 16667 0 5167 4 2% -G5 5% 
0 95 
0 42 0 6667 2 3633 0 5167 0 2167 40 4% ■90 9% 
0 25 16333 3 2500 16667 0.6333 1.6% -60.5% 
oe 
OS 0 42 1 1667 2 4000 0 6G33 0 3000 41 4% -G7 5% 
0 25 2 7667 3 5667 2 2000 0 5667 -20 5% ■64 1% 
0.95 
0.42 1.3000 2.3633 0.6633 0.2167 -32.1% -90.9% 
0 25 3 0G33 31G33 2 5333 0 4667 -17 S% -G5 3% 
OVERALL PREFORMANCE 1.6625 1.622917 1.396956 0 201042 -24.9% -67.6% 
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munition performance. Recall that search weight is the rela tive benefit of continuing to 
search for additional new valid targets compared to attacking already known targets.  
Table 10 Number of Killed Targets/False Target Attacks at Low Search Weight 
 
Table 11 Number of Killed Targets/False Target Attacks at High Search Weight 
 
At low search weight both no cooperation and cooperation execute more attacks 
on targets than they do for high search weights. It is seen that high search weight has 
decreased the number of killed targets drastically. This is due to the fact that munitions 
No-cooperaUon CooperaUcm tf of Kills 
IniprovpiTipnl 
False Target 
AlldckDpQPdSP Weighl^ FK FTAR (^Munilion FT. l^ofM? & of FTA tfofMs & of FTA 
0,25 
0.5 
0002 
4 
oe 12333 0 20DD 0 7333 0 0000 -40 5% -100 0% 
0.95 1.3667 0.1833 1.0833 0.0000 '20.7% -100.0% 
8 
08 22167 05333 1.4500 oocco -34,6% '100.0% 
095 25833 0 4333 21333 OOOH) -17.4% '100.0% 
0.02 
A 
oe 2 01E7 0 21E7 1 1G33 0 0000 ■41.3% -100.0% 
0.95 2.2B33 D.20DD 1.6167 0.0000 -29.2% -100.0% 
8 
0.8 3.1667 0.4333 2.2500 0.0000 -28.9% -100.0% 
0.95 3.8833 0.3667 30333 0.0000 '21.9% -100.0% 
0.8 
0.002 
4 
0.8 0.8000 1.7567 0 6667 0 2667 '15 7% -84.9% 
0.95 0.9JJJ 1.G500 0.9500 0 2B33 1.8% -82.8% 
8 
08 l.GOOO 3.5667 16667 0 5167 4 2% -855% 
095 18333 32500 18667 06333 18% -805% 
0.02 
4 
0.8 1.4667 1.8167 1.0500 0.2667 -28 4% -85 3% 
0.95 1.7000 l.hH^^ 1.4500 0.2333 -14.7% -86.1% 
8 
0.8 2.7G67 3.5E67 2.2000 0 5667 -20.5% mi% 
0.95 3.0933 3.1833 25333 0 4667 -17 8% -85.3% 
OVERALL PREFORMANCE 2.0583 1JJ06 16167 0 2021 -21 5% -B60% 
Ho-coopeiation CooperaUon # of Kills 
Impiovemeflt 
False Taiget 
Attack Decrease Wti^l^ PK FTAR ffMumliim FT. ffofKiU? ffofFTA ff of Kills ffofFTA 
0.42 
0.5 
0.002 
4 
OB 0 5500 01000 0 2B33 0 0000 ■4B 5% -100.0% 
095 065CO 0C667 04500 OODDO -3D B% '1000% 
8 
08 08667 02500 0 4500 00000 -461% -1000% 
0.95 09500 02833 0.6167 0.0000 ■35.1% ■100.0% 
0.02 
4 
0.8 0.8167 0.1000 0.4333 OOOCO -46.9% -100.0% 
0.95 1.0333 0.0B67 0.6500 0 0000 '37.1% -100.0% 
B 
0.8 1.2333 0 2500 0 7167 0 0000 -419% -100.0% 
0.95 1.4333 0.2833 0 9567 00000 '326% -100.0% 
0.8 
0.002 
4 
08 05000 10G67 0 2167 01667 '56 7% -844% 
0.95 0.6333 10000 0.2833 01500 -553% -850% 
8 
0.8 0.8500 24000 0.4167 03000 -51.0% ■87.5% 
0.95 0.8667 23833 0.5167 0.2167 -40.4% -90.9% 
0.02 
4 
03 0 7167 10667 0 3657 01567 '48.8% -84 4% 
0 95 0 9167 10000 0 4633 01500 ■473% -850% 
8 
GB 1 1667 2 4000 0 5B33 0 3000 -414% -875% 
095 13000 2 3S33 0SS33 0 2167 -321% '909% 
OVERALL PREFORMAJ^CE 0 9052 D.943B 0.5260 01042 ■41 9% -89.0% 
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prefer to continue to search for additional targets instead of attacking the already known 
ones.  Although a value of 0.5 would set the search and attack benefits equal to their 
calculated probabilities of success; however, this research, as in previous research by 
Dunkel (1), demonstrated the need to adjust the weights accordingly.  
4.5 False Target Attack Rate Effects  
As discussed in previous chapters false target attack rate (FTAR) is a very 
important measure for evaluating the effectiveness of wide area search munitions. The 
next two tables show the effects of FTAR on the performance of cooperative and non-
cooperative munitions.  
Table 12 shows the performance of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior at 
low FTAR values and Table 13 shows the comparative performance for a higher FTAR 
value. As it can be seen from the table non-cooperative behavior killed more targets than 
the cooperative behavior. On the other hand cooperative behavior executes very few false 
target attacks. This is a very important consideration for cooperative algorithms. 
Table 12 Number of Killed Targets/False Target Attacks at Low FTAR 
 
No-CO operation Coopeialion tfofMs 
Improvement 
False Target 
Attack Decrease FTAR PK ^Munition PTTL Weighty a of Ms U of FTA a of Ms U of FTA 
0.002 
0.5 
4 
08 
0 42 0 5500 01000 0 2833 0 0000 -48 5% -100 0% 
0 25 12333 0 2000 0 7333 0 0000 -40 5% -100 0% 
0 95 
0 42 0 6500 0 0667 0 4500 0 0000 ■30 5% -100.0% 
0 25 13667 01833 10833 0 0000 -20 7% -100 0% 
8 
08 0.42 
0 6667 0 2500 0 4500 0 0000 -46.1% -100 0% 
0 25 22167 0 5333 14500 0 0000 '34 6% -100 0% 
0 95 
0.42 Q.950Q 0.2633 0.6167 0.0000 -35.1% -100.0% 
0 25 2 5833 0 4333 21333 0 0000 -17 4% -100 0% 
08 
4 
08 0.42 0.6167 0.1000 0.4333 0.0000 -46.9% -100.0% 
0 25 2 0167 0 2167 1 1833 0 0000 -41 3% -100 0% 
0 95 
0 42 1.0333 0 0667 0 6500 0 0000 -371% -100 0% 
0 25 2 2S33 U JUUU 16167 0 0000 -29 2% -100 0% 
B 
O.B 
0 42 12333 0 2500 0 7167 0 0000 -41 9% -100 0% 
0.25 31667 0.4333 2.2500 0.0000 -26.9% -100.0% 
0.95 
0 42 14333 0 2833 0 9667 0 0000 -32 6% -100 0% 
0.25 3.6633 0.3667 3.0333 0.0000 -21.9% -100 0% 
OVERALL PREFORMANCE 1.6427 0.2479 1.1261 0.0000 -31.3% -100.0% 
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This may indicate that for moderate to high FTAR rate cooperative behavior can improve 
the overall performance by reducing the number of false target attacks, leaving more 
munitions available to find and attack real targets. 
 
Table 13 Number of Killed Targets/False Target Attacks at High FTAR 
 
 
4.6 Overall results. 
As discussed in previous sections non-cooperative munitions perform better than 
the cooperative munitions in terms of number of killed targets, and cooperative munitions 
reduced the number of false target attacks to near zero! Table 14 shows the overall results 
of all scenarios for number of killed targets and number of attacks executed on the false 
targets. Non-cooperative munitions executed more attacks on both real targets and false 
targets, resulting in more killed targets and false targets attacks and kills. Cooperative 
behavior in wide area search munitions did not improve the number of targets killed, but 
decreased the number of false targets attacks significantly compared to non-cooperative 
. No'Coopeialion CoopeTalion JJofKiUs 
Improvement 
False Targft 
Attack Decrease FTAR PK flMumUon PIT: Weighty # of Ms # of FTA # of Ms # of FTA 
0 02 
05 
4 
OG 
0.42 0.5000 1.0667 0.2167 0.1667 -56.7% -84.4% 
0 25 OSOOO 17667 0 6667 0 2667 -16 7% -84 9% 
0 95 
0 42 0G333 10000 0 2G33 01500 -55 3% -85 0% 
0 25 0.9333 16500 0 9500 0.2833 1.8% -82.8% 
8 
OG 
0.42 0.6500 2.4000 0.4167 0.3000 -51.0% -87.5% 
0 25 16000 3 5667 16667 0 5167 4 2% -85 5% 
0 95 
0 42 0GGG7 2 3G33 0 5167 0 2167 -40 4% -90 9% 
0 25 1.8333 3.2500 1.8667 0.6333 1.8% -80.5% 
08 
4 
08 
0 42 0 7167 10667 0 3667 01667 -48 8% -84 4% 
0 25 14667 1G167 10500 0 2667 -28 4% -85 3% 
0 95 
0 42 0 9167 10000 0 4833 0.1500 -47 3% -85 0% 
0.25 1.7000 1.6833 1.4500 0.2333 -14.7% -85.1% 
8 
0.8 
0 42 1 1667 2 4000 0 6833 0 3000 -41 4% -87 5% 
0 25 2 7667 3 5667 2 2000 0 5667 -20 5% -841% 
0 95 
0 42 13000 2 3833 0 8833 0.2167 -32.1% -90.9% 
0.25 3.0833 3.1833 2.5333 0.4667 -17.8% -85.3% 
OVERALL PREFORMANCE 13208 21365 10145 0 3063 -23 2% -85 7% 
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behavior. Cooperative behavior decreased the number of killed targets by 27.7% and also 
decreased the false target attacks by 87.2%. The decrease in false target attacks is a 
promising improvement for cooperative behavior algorithms in wide area search 
munitions.  
Table 14 Number of Killed Targets/False Target Attacks for Overall Simulation Results 
 
In order to make a reasonable trade off and take advantage of cooperative behavior in 
munitions systems, it is very important to understand the performance of cooperative 
behavior under varying scenarios. Although cooperative munitions performed worse than 
the non-cooperative munitions for in terms of target kills, for low warhead lethality, high 
No-coopetalion Cooperation flofMs 
Impiovement 
False Target 
Attack Decrease PK FTAR ittMumlion PTK Weight^ a of Ms U of FTA U of Ms U of FTA 
05 
0 002 
4 
0.8 
0 4? 0 5500 01000 0 2833 0 '48 5% '100 0% 
025 12333 0 2000 0 7333 0 -40 5% -100 0% 
0.95 
0.42 0 6500 0 0667 0 4500 0 '30.8% -100.0% 
025 13667 01B33 10833 0 -20.7% -100 0% 
B 
08 
0 42 0 8567 0 2500 0 4600 0 -481% -100 0% 
025 2 2167 0 5333 14500 0 '34 6% '100 0% 
0.95 
0.J2 0 9500 0 2833 0 6167 0 '351% -100 0% 
0.25 2.5833 0.4333 2.1333 0 -17.4% -100.0% 
0 02 
4 
oa 0 42 0 5000 10667 02167 01667 -56 7% -84 4% 
0 25 oaooo 17557 0 6557 0 2557 -15 7% -34 9% 
0 95 
0 42 0 6333 10000 0 2833 01500 '55 3% '85 0% 
0 25 0 9333 16500 0 9500 0 2833 18% -82 8% 
3 
oa 0.42 0 8500 2 4000 0.4167 0.3000 -51.0% -87 5% 
0 25 16000 3 5667 16667 05167 4 2% ■85 5% 
0.95 
0 42 0 9667 2 3333 0 6157 0 2167 -40 4% -90 9% 
0 25 18333 3 2500 18667 0 6333 18% -80 5% 
08 
0 002 
4 
OB 0 42 
0 8167 01000 0 4333 0 -46 9% -100 0% 
0 25 2 0167 0 2167 1 1833 0 ■41 3% -100 0% 
0.95 
0 42 10333 0 0667 0 6500 0 -371% -100 0% 
0 25 2 2S33 0 2000 16167 0 '29 2% '100 0% 
8 
0.8 
0 42 12333 0 2500 0 7167 0 -41 9% -100 0% 
0.25 31667 0 4333 2 2500 0 -28 9% -100 0% 
095 
0 42 14333 0 2833 0 9667 0 -32 6% -100 0% 
0 26 3 3333 0 3557 3 0333 0 -21 9% -100 0% 
0 02 
4 
0.8 0 42 
0 7167 10667 0 3667 01667 '48 8% '84 4% 
0 25 14667 18167 10500 0 2667 -28 4% -85 3% 
095 0.42 
0 9167 10000 0 4833 01500 -47.3% -85.0% 
0 25 17000 16833 14500 0 2333 -14 7% -861% 
B 
0.8 
0 42 1 1567 2 4000 0 5333 0 3000 -41 4% -87 5% 
025 2 7667 3 5667 2 2000 0 5667 '20 5% '841% 
0 95 
0 42 13000 2 3833 0 8833 0 2167 -32 1% -90 9% 
0 25 3 0833 31833 2 5333 0 4667 -17 8% -36 3% 
OVERALL PREFORMANCE 1 481771 1 192188 1.071354167 0153125 -27 7% -87.2% 
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PTR, greater number of munitions and higher FTAR scenarios cooperative behavior 
achieved significant reductions in the number of false target attacks, at the expense of a 
relatively small decrease in number of killed targets.  
FTAR and probability of target report are competing objects. For a given sensor and 
ATR system, lower FTAR and higher PTR cannot be achieved simultaneously. One must 
make some trade off between these competing objects. Keeping FTAR too low leads to a 
higher rate of missed targets. Likewise, having PTR   too high makes the ATR system very 
sensitive, resulting in a higher FTAR due to the misidentification of non-targets targets 
as. One possibility for a trade off between these objectives is to adjust the ATR to keep 
PTR  high, and apply cooperative behavior to achieve a lower false target attack rate. This 
is a relatively easy and cost effective way to get the desired ATR performance without 
incurring the size and cost of a more sophisticated ATR system. Further, combining this 
approach with small low cost warheads (low PK) potentially leads to a small, low-cost 
system that can be employed in greater numbers. The platform that launches these wide 
area search munitions, a fighter aircraft, cargo or even a UAV, will have the ability to 
carry more munitions to achieve mission success. The increase in the number of 
munitions will also increase the reliability of the overall munition system. Hence, an 
effective munition system can be achieved cost efficiently.    
4.7 Number of Attacks  
In this section the performance of cooperative and non-cooperative munitions will 
be examined for number of false target attacks and real target attacks. Non-cooperative 
munitions executed more attacks on both real and false targets than the cooperative 
munitions. In order to understand the effectiveness and value of the attacks, the number 
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of attacks executed on individual targets and the total number of attacks made by 
munitions will be compared.  
4.7.1 False target attacks.  Figure 4 shows the number of false targets 
(#AttackedFalseTgt ) attacked and the total number of attacks (#AttacksFalseTgts) made on 
false targets by cooperative munitions.  As can be seen from Figure 4, for low FTAR 
cooperative munitions have zero attacks on false targets. With low search weight and low 
warhead lethality scenarios (PK = 0.5), cooperative munitions execute more attacks on 
previously attacked false targets. Once a false target is falsely classified as a valid target, 
munitions treat it as a real target and calculate task benefits as if it is a real target. This is 
due to the fact that benefit calculations for low warhead lethality give a higher probability 
that the attacked target is still alive than in the high warhead lethality scenarios. In 
addition, a low search weight results in munitions attacking known targets rather than 
looking for additional targets. As a result, cooperative munitions execute multiple attacks 
on targets that have been attacked previously but likely still alive. For all other scenarios 
munitions rarely attack an already attacked false target. 
The number of false targets that have been attacked and the total number of 
attacks made on false targets by non-cooperative munitions is shown Figure 5.  Non-
cooperative munitions attack known targets at a smaller ratio for low warhead lethality 
and low search weight.  This is as expected since non-cooperative munitions have no 
communication and therefore have no knowledge of previous attacks. 
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Figure 4 Number of False Target Attacks for Cooperative Munitions 
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Figure 5 Number of False Target Attacks for Non-cooperative Munitions 
 
4.7.2 Real Target Attacks. Figure 6 shows the number of real targets 
(#AttackedTargets) that have been attacked and the total number of attacks 
(#AttacksTargets) made on real targets by cooperative munitions.   
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Figure 6 Number of Real Target Attacks for Cooperative Munitions 
The number of real targets attacked and the total number of attacks made on real targets 
by non-cooperative munitions is shown Figure 7.   
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Figure 7 Number of Real Target Attacks for Non-cooperative Munitions 
 
At low search weight and low warhead lethality scenarios (PK = 0.5) cooperative 
munitions execute more attacks on previously attacked targets than the non cooperative 
munitions. Again, this is due to the fact that benefit calculations at low warhead lethality 
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gives a higher probability that the attacked target is still alive than the high warhead 
lethality scenarios. In addition, a low search weight promotes in munitions attacking on 
known targets rather than looking for additional new targets. As a result cooperative 
munitions executed multiple attacks on targets that have been attacked previously but 
likely still alive. For all of the other scenarios munitions did not attack an already 
attacked target. If munitions had continued the search longer for additional targets rather 
than attacking previously attacked ones, the number of real target kills might have been 
higher. 
Another factor that shows the performance of munitions is the ratio of real target 
attacks to the total number of attacks. The ratio of real target attacks to the total number 
of attacks for cooperative and non-cooperative munitions is shown in Figure 8.  The 
overall ratios for cooperative and non-cooperative munitions are 0.92 and 0.7 
respectively.  The performance of non-cooperative munitions is significantly worse than 
the cooperative behavior. For the high FTAR scenarios, the ratio of real target attacks to 
the total number of attacks for non- cooperative munitions varies   from 0.39 to 0.57.  
Therefore, nearly half of the total attacks executed by non- cooperative munitions have 
been on the false targets. The cooperative munitions achieved a ratio of 0.8 for the same 
cases. Even though, as mentioned in previous sections, non cooperative munition killed 
more targets than the cooperative munitions, they also attacked a great number of false 
targets. 
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Figure 8 Ratio of Real Target Attacks to Total Number of Attacks 
 
4.8 Hit Formula  
A hit formula has been used to evaluate the performance of cooperative and non-
cooperative munitions. High and low priority targets were used in this research: two high 
priority and four low priority targets are distributed among 26 false targets.  A hit formula 
has been calculated in the simulation to see the effects of discrimination between the 
target priorities and the effects of false target attacks. The hit formula can be expressed as 
(1):  
Hit Formula=2. (# High priority attacks) + 
(# Low priority attacks) – (# false target attacks)     (4.1) 
        As can be seen from the formula, emphasis is put on high priority attacks by 
multiplying it by two and a penalty is given to false target attacks by subtracting it from 
the overall hit formula value. Figure 9 shows the performance of cooperative and non-
cooperative munitions in terms of the hit formula. 
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Figure 9 Performance of Cooperative and Non-cooperative Munitions for Hit Formula 
 
Non-cooperative munitions achieved better formula values for the first 16 low FTAR 
value scenarios, but for high FTAR values (scenarios 17-32) cooperative munitions 
outperformed the non-cooperative munitions. As discussed in previous sections non-
cooperative munitions executed more attacks on false and real targets, but the relatively 
low number of false target attacks for the low FTAR scenarios allowed the non-
cooperative munitions to outperform the cooperative ones in terms of the hit formula. For 
higher FTAR scenarios, the cooperative munitions were more likely to have munitions 
still available to attack high priority targets, and more likely to attack high priority targets 
with more than one munition to achieve target kill.  
4.9 Discrimination between Target Types 
In this section the ability of cooperative and non-cooperative munitions of discriminating 
between high and low priority targets will be analyzed. Figure 10 shows the ratio of high 
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priority attacks to total real target attacks for cooperative and non-cooperative munitions 
for low FTAR value scenarios (see Appendix for parameters).  
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Figure 10 Comparisons of Ratio of High Priority Attacks to Total Real Target Attacks  
 
Although cooperative munitions have executed fewer attacks on targets through the 
simulation, they improve the quality of attacks. They attack high priority targets at a 
higher ratio than the non-cooperative munitions. This is an important improvement in 
favor of cooperative behavior. In real life scenarios it might be very important to 
distinguish between target priorities to accomplish the mission successfully. It is often 
more beneficial to destroy the high priority targets rather than destroying greater number 
of low priority targets. 
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V. Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1 Conclusions   
      In this research the performance of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior in 
autonomous wide area search munitions has been investigated. As discussed in chapter I, 
scenarios and munitions used in this research are generic and conclusions made on the 
performance can be applied to a broad family of wide area search munitions. 
The results of the simulation were examined under characteristics of warhead 
lethality, ATR capability, false target attack rate, number of munitions deployed in the 
simulation, and search weight.  Number of killed targets, false target attacks, Hit formula 
and total attacks have been studied for all of the above characteristics.  
Cooperative munitions a demonstrated significant decrease in the number of 
killed targets. In comparison, cooperative behavior performed very well in terms of false 
target attacks. Cooperative behavior reduced the number of false target attacks by 87.2%, 
and  in some scenarios cooperative munitions did not execute any false target attacks, 
hence making more munitions available for attacking valid targets. A decrease in false 
target attacks is very important and represents a promising improvement for cooperative 
behavior. The decrease in the number of killed targets for cooperative behavior is due to 
the loss of additional time for classification of targets, more missed targets due to a 
requirement for confirming classification prior to attack and executing multiple attacks 
on high priority targets. Non-cooperative munitions execute nearly as many attacks on 
false targets as they do on real targets. This reduces the efficiency of a single munition 
and wastes valuable munitions.  
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Cooperative behavior increased the quality of attacks executed on targets. 
Cooperative munitions attacked high priority targets at a ratio higher than the non-
cooperative munitions achieved. This shows that cooperative behavior can improve the 
selectivity of wide area search munitions. However, the effort for cooperative munitions 
to attack high priority targets may reduce the number of total attacks that can be 
executed. The cooperative munitions achieved better hit formula values for high FTAR 
values and for overall results due to the low number of false target attacks and a greater 
number of high priority target hits. 
Although cooperative munitions performed worse than the non-cooperative 
munitions in terms of target kills, for low warhead lethality, high PTR, greater number of 
munitions and high FTAR scenarios cooperative behavior achieved better results when 
compared to its performance for high warhead lethality, low PTR, fewer number of 
munitions and low FTAR scenarios. FTAR and probability of target report are competing 
objects. For a given munition system, lower FTAR and higher PTR cannot be achieved 
simultaneously. One must make some trade off between these competing objects. 
Keeping FTAR too low leads the ATR system to overlook some alarms and results in 
higher rate of missed targets. Likewise keeping PTR  too high  makes the  ATR system 
very sensitive to any kind of alarms detected by the sensor, resulting in a higher FTAR 
due to the misidentification non-targets. 
 One suggestion for trade off between these objectives is to adjust the ATR to keep 
PTR high, and apply cooperative behavior to the munition system to achieve the desired 
low false target attack rates. This is a cost effective way to get the desired ATR 
performance without resorting to a larger, more expensive sensor/ATR system. Further, 
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combining this approach with small low cost warheads (low PK) results in small 
munitions that can be employed in greater numbers. The platform that launches these 
wide area search munitions will have the ability to carry more munitions to achieve the 
mission with success. The increase in the number of munitions will also increase the 
reliability of the overall munition system. Hence an effective munition system can be 
achieved cost efficiently. It is believed that tailoring the degree of cooperation to the real 
life situation may produce desirable results in terms of mission success. 
5.2 Recommendations for Further Research 
      Modeling real life is beyond the scope of this study. In order to achieve the goal 
of this research some simplifying assumptions needed to be made. These assumptions 
and simplifications are left as recommendations for further researches. 
1. For the purposes of this research all communication between munitions 
are assumed reliable and on time. There is no communication delay, 
signal degradation or broadcasting errors. Communication is one of the 
important factors of determining the performance of wide area search 
munitions. Communication faults, broadcasting poor and bad information 
can be a field of interest for further research. 
2. In this research all targets and non-targets are modeled as stationary. 
Mobile targets will challenge cooperative algorithms because of the need 
for confirming classification and multiple attacks. If the target has moved, 
the second munition assigned to a target may have spend additional time 
relocating it. Mobile targets are left as a recommendation for further 
research as well.  
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3. In this research 4 and 8 munition are studied. Increasing the number of 
the munitions is a very complex procedure and is left as a 
recommendation as well. The effects due to  number of munitions are 
very significant on performance of cooperative and non cooperative 
munitions. The effect of greater number of munitions will provide further 
insight.  
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Appendix A:  Test Matrices 
 
 
Test Matrix for Non-cooperative Scenarios 
Scenario Cooperation FTAR PK Nmun PTR Search Weight 
1 No 0.002 0.5 4 0.8 0.42 
2 No 0.002 0.5 4 0.8 0.25 
3 No 0.002 0.5 4 0.95 0.42 
4 No 0.002 0.5 4 0.95 0.25 
5 No 0.002 0.5 8 0.8 0.42 
6 No 0.002 0.5 8 0.8 0.25 
7 No 0.002 0.5 8 0.95 0.42 
8 No 0.002 0.5 8 0.95 0.25 
9 No 0.002 0.8 4 0.8 0.42 
10 No 0.002 0.8 4 0.8 0.25 
11 No 0.002 0.8 4 0.95 0.42 
12 No 0.002 0.8 4 0.95 0.25 
13 No 0.002 0.8 8 0.8 0.42 
14 No 0.002 0.8 8 0.8 0.25 
15 No 0.002 0.8 8 0.95 0.42 
16 No 0.002 0.8 8 0.95 0.25 
17 No 0.02 0.5 4 0.8 0.42 
18 No 0.02 0.5 4 0.8 0.25 
19 No 0.02 0.5 4 0.95 0.42 
20 No 0.02 0.5 4 0.95 0.25 
21 No 0.02 0.5 8 0.8 0.42 
22 No 0.02 0.5 8 0.8 0.25 
23 No 0.02 0.5 8 0.95 0.42 
24 No 0.02 0.5 8 0.95 0.25 
25 No 0.02 0.8 4 0.8 0.42 
26 No 0.02 0.8 4 0.8 0.25 
27 No 0.02 0.8 4 0.95 0.42 
28 No 0.02 0.8 4 0.95 0.25 
29 No 0.02 0.8 8 0.8 0.42 
30 No 0.02 0.8 8 0.8 0.25 
31 No 0.02 0.8 8 0.95 0.42 
32 No 0.02 0.8 8 0.95 0.25 
 
 
 
 
 55
 
 
Test Matrix for Cooperative Scenarios 
 
Scenario Cooperation FTAR PK Nmun PTR Search Weight 
1 Yes 0.002 0.5 4 0.8 0.42 
2 Yes 0.002 0.5 4 0.8 0.25 
3 Yes 0.002 0.5 4 0.95 0.42 
4 Yes 0.002 0.5 4 0.95 0.25 
5 Yes 0.002 0.5 8 0.8 0.42 
6 Yes 0.002 0.5 8 0.8 0.25 
7 Yes 0.002 0.5 8 0.95 0.42 
8 Yes 0.002 0.5 8 0.95 0.25 
9 Yes 0.002 0.8 4 0.8 0.42 
10 Yes 0.002 0.8 4 0.8 0.25 
11 Yes 0.002 0.8 4 0.95 0.42 
12 Yes 0.002 0.8 4 0.95 0.25 
13 Yes 0.002 0.8 8 0.8 0.42 
14 Yes 0.002 0.8 8 0.8 0.25 
15 Yes 0.002 0.8 8 0.95 0.42 
16 Yes 0.002 0.8 8 0.95 0.25 
17 Yes 0.02 0.5 4 0.8 0.42 
18 Yes 0.02 0.5 4 0.8 0.25 
19 Yes 0.02 0.5 4 0.95 0.42 
20 Yes 0.02 0.5 4 0.95 0.25 
21 Yes 0.02 0.5 8 0.8 0.42 
22 Yes 0.02 0.5 8 0.8 0.25 
23 Yes 0.02 0.5 8 0.95 0.42 
24 Yes 0.02 0.5 8 0.95 0.25 
25 Yes 0.02 0.8 4 0.8 0.42 
26 Yes 0.02 0.8 4 0.8 0.25 
27 Yes 0.02 0.8 4 0.95 0.42 
28 Yes 0.02 0.8 4 0.95 0.25 
29 Yes 0.02 0.8 8 0.8 0.42 
30 Yes 0.02 0.8 8 0.8 0.25 
31 Yes 0.02 0.8 8 0.95 0.42 
32 Yes 0.02 0.8 8 0.95 0.25 
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